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Evolution of Specialization with Reachable Transaction Scope
Based on a Simple and Symmetric Firm Resource Allocation Model
Xiao Sun, Yueting Chai , Yi Liu, Jianping Shen, and Yadong Huang
Abstract: In the last decade, as an emerging transaction measure driven by computer and internet technology,
e-commerce experienced explosive growth in many areas. It has greatly broken down the limitations of space and
time to economic activities, thus changing the rules of business fundamentally. Significant work has been done
to understand the laws of e-commerce from multiple dimensions, but the question of how e-commerce shapes
firms’ specialization and market structure from the perspective of spatial factors remains obscure. In this paper, we
propose a simple and symmetric firm resource allocation model with a specialized-economy production function
and market size constraint, to investigate how individual firms adjust resource allocation with reachable transaction
scope expanded. It is shown that with the expansion of reachable transaction scope, individual firms discretely
take back one unit resource from a low-investment direction and, instead, channel it to a “specialized direction”.
Meanwhile, at the macro level, an optimal division network evolves from a static self-sufficient stage to a diverse
semi-specialized stage, and finally to a highly integrated completely specialized stage. Ergo, a Complex Adaptive
System (CAS) based simulation framework is constructed. Designed simulation experiments are carried out and
confirm to the analysis result of our proposed model.
Key words: e-commerce; evolution; reachable transaction scope; resource allocation; complex adaptive system
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Introduction

Breaking down the limitations of space and time
to economic activities, e-commerce has changed
business logic fundamentally and brought boundless
possibilities for both merchants and consumers. Due
to underdeveloped and high-cost traditional offline
commercial channels, Chinese consumers seem to have
exhibited a strong desire to shop online. According
to the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s total
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e-commerce transaction volume reached 2.6 trillion
dollars in 2014, with an annual growth rate of 59.4%.
Another example is the day of November 11, which
marks an online shopping festival created by Alibaba,
and named Double-Eleven. On Double-Eleven day
2015, Chinese online shoppers were responsible for 14
billion dollars in transactions on just one e-commerce
website, tmall.com. As a comparison, on Black Friday
2015, the total sales of offline physical stores in
USA amounted to 10.4 billion dollars, according
to ShopperTrak’s statistical report. After more than
10 years of rapid development, nowadays no one
would doubt e-commerce is playing a more and more
important role in modern society and people’s daily
lives, especially in China.
In a context of ongoing vigorous development,
however, for a prolonged period, e-commerce
practitioners have been uncertain on one question,
that is, what kind of business model or commercial
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form is efficient now and promising in the future?
In the last decade, e-commerce companies conducted
various inquiries into this question. Take China’s largest
proprietary B2C company, JD, as an example, who
started business as an online digital products seller in
2003 and experienced exponential growth since 2007,
when they expanded their product line to large family
appliances. Besides being an online store, as its core
competency, JD also operates a substantial logistics
business. Also, in 2010 JD reconfigured its role to be
partly an e-commerce platform service provider, and
opened information and distribution resources to small
businesses. Meanwhile, Alibaba treads a different path.
Since inception, Alibaba has positioned itself as a
platform to serve small businesses. Instead of selling
products, Alibaba runs an information platform and
online payment tool through independent companies.
As the lead investor, it has organized major express
companies to optimize China’s logistics infrastructure.
Alibaba emphasized that it would never buy any vehicle
or hire delivery personnel, but keep focused on building
their core platform. Alibaba and JD basically represent
two kinds of e-commerce business models. Between
and beyond them there are diverse business models
and numerous service configurations existing in the
e-commerce market. Are they efficient at firm and
market level? What is the development direction of
e-commerce practitioners and the e-commerce market?
Addressing these related issues has certain practical
background and significance.
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Related Work

Corresponding to the rapid growth of information
technology, e-commerce is attracting significant
academic attention in diverse areas. In the early stage,
since eBay started business with an online auction,
auction mechanisms[1, 2] were a popular topic at that
time. As a continuation and extension of this line
of research, trading mechanism analysis and system
design, such as SME e-commerce trading[3] , culture
sensitive design[4] , social commerce design[5] , and
so on, attract much academic attention to this day.
Meanwhile, as an interdisciplinary field, trust[6] ,
reputation[7] , privacy security[8] , recommendation
systems[9] , data processing technology[10] , and many
other issues are pertinent to investigating the ecommerce domain.
Among these issues, we focus our attention on
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firm-level resource allocation strategy according to
external market conditions. Some related work has been
done on this topic, in terms of model construction,
empirical studies, computer simulations, or some
combination of these three. For example, using
a resource-based view of the firm and archival
data on UK companies, Nath et al.[11] found
firms would be better sustained if they focused
on a narrow portfolio of products/services across
diverse geographical markets. From the perspective of
computer simulation, Coen and Maritan[12] modeled the
process of firms competing for opportunities to invest
capacities and resource allocation dynamics. In terms
of model construction and analysis, Anders et al.[13]
proposed a trust- and cooperation-based algorithm for a
multi-agent system to determine specific total resource
demand. After summarizing current studies on the firm
resource allocation problem, they mainly focus on
how resource allocation strategies can help to optimize
individual or system level performance, but lack the
evolutionary angle to explore how optimal individual
resource allocation and optimal system structure change
with external conditions. Indeed, current studies
overlook underlying evolutionary dynamics, which has
a dominant effect on determining optimal resource
allocation. In our model, the evolutionary path will
be emphasized and evolutionary dynamics will be
explicitly expressed.
On the construction of individual-based models,
new classical economy and its inframarginal
analysis method, pioneered by Yang[14] , provides
much inspiration. Infrarmaginal analysis is a set of
optimization methods to solve for optimal individual
decisions and optimal network of division of labor.
In new classical economy, individuals are conceived
as a particular type of prosumer. The individual sells
self-produced products to others, and buys needed
products from others at the same time. The products
individuals purchase are discounted according to a
transaction efficiency parameter, which is a number
between 0 and 1. Yang[14] drew the conclusion that
with increasing transaction efficiency, individuals’
optimal decisions jump among several corner point
solutions and with it, the macro-level network of
division of labor evolves. Inframarginal analysis has
been exploited in many areas of economic research
and boasts many achievements[15–17] . However, as
a highly abstracted economic model, inframarginal
analysis cannot be applied to e-commerce market
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contexts directly. Two main reasons account for
this. First, the consumer-producer assumption is
not applicable in the e-commerce market, because
e-commerce firms face end consumers and purchase
nothing from them. For example, an online shopper
can buy a product via amazon.com after paying
some amount of money, but as a company, Amazon
does not need to buy anything from such individual
purchasers. The consumer-producer assumption is
thus not empirically viable here. Second, the crucial
evolutionary dynamic in inframarginal analysis, the
transaction efficiency parameter, is too abstract to
understand and measure effectively, and thus difficult
to justify. Thus, inframarginal analysis poses certain
problems in the context of e-commerce.
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)[18] is another
mechanism by which to investigate micro-level
individual decision-making behaviors and the evolution
of macro system phenomena. From the perspective
of CAS, numerous micro-level individuals’ adaption
behaviors lead to the complexity of the macro
system. Following this idea, various systems have
been investigated and identified to be a CAS, such
as markets[19] , supply chain networks[20, 21] , ecoindustrial parks[22] , technological inventions[23] , new
products development[24] , and so on. Also, combined
with multi-agent based simulation technology, CAS
concepts and methodologies have been exploited to
address a large range of problems, including herd
behavior[25] , the risk-return relationship[26] , in resource
allocation systems, supply network evolution[27] ,
natural resource management[28] , rangeland system
evolution[29] , e-commerce transaction networks[30] , and
so on. CAS related concepts, theory, methodology, and
techniques offer us a series of tools to investigate the
dynamic, nonlinear, and discrete characteristics during
the evolutionary process. However, in order to draw
conclusions from CAS through simulations, a large
number of parameters need to be tested repeatedly.
Further, the conclusions generated from simulation
experiments are typically fragmented, global optimal
solutions are not typical.
Our contribution in this paper is to combine
the approaches of model construction and computer
simulation, in order to explore the evolutionary path
of optimal firm resource allocation and optimal market
structure based on external evolutionary dynamics,
which is explicitly formulated in terms of reachable
transaction scope. An individual firm based model
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is developed and utilized to derive global optimal
solutions, and a series of CAS-based simulation
experiments are carried out which validate analytical
results.
We find that with the expansion of reachable
transaction scope from local to full coverage, the
individual firm discretely takes back one unit input
from a low-investment direction and, instead, channels
it to a “specialized direction”. Accordingly, optimal
market structure changes from a self-sufficient stage to
a semi-specialized stage, and finally to a completely
specialized stage. Of note, we propose and prove a
series of definitions and propositions to characterize
division network evolution. We find that in a fully
evolved e-commerce market, firms are highly integrated
and tightly coupled.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 3, model forms are proposed first, constraints
are explained, and solutions are given. Then based
on model analysis results, the evolution characteristics
of division network are investigated and a series of
propositions are given. Next, to validate our model,
in Section 4, a CAS-based simulation framework is
constructed, experiments are designed, and results are
discussed. Finally in Section 5, we draw conclusions
and several future research directions are suggested.

3

Model

Market evolution cannot occur without micro
individuals. Numerous independent and autonomous
individuals
drive
system
level
evolutionary
behaviors[18] . In this paper, we follow this bottomup idea. To explore the evolution of the market, a
micro-level resource allocation model should first be
established to characterize individual firms.
3.1

Conceptual description

In a market where all consumers need n types of
service, the firm resource allocation strategy is modeled
conceptually as Formula (1).
Max P .L; S /
s.t. R.L/ D 0I
pi D f .li /; i D 1; 2; :::; nI
(1)
C.pi ; si / 6 0; i D 1; 2; :::; nI
M.N; si / 6 0; i D 1; 2; :::; nI
si 2 NC
In the above conceptual model, n represents the
number of demanded services. P (L, S) is the profit
function of the individual firm, where vector L=[l1 ; l2 ,
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. . . , ln ] represents its resource allocation scheme among
n service directions, and vector S D Œs1 ; s2 ;. . . , sn ]
represents the number of consumers who purchased
services from this firm, si 2 NC . R.L/ D 0 is the
resource constraint of the individual firm. It implies the
total amount of resources a firm could access cannot be
exceeded, and is limited by an upper bound. pi D f .li /
is the production function of the i-th service, where
pi represents the output amount of the i-th service.
C.pi ; si / 6 0 is the production capacity constraint of
the individual firm; thus, the number of consumers who
purchased the i -th service from a firm is limited by
its output amount. M.Ni ; si / 6 0 is the market size
constraint of the individual firm; thus, the number
of consumers who purchased the i-th service from a
firm is limited by the market size that a firm could
achieve under current external condition. Parameter
N is a positive integer, which represents the number
of consumers within the current reachable transaction
scope.
3.2
3.2.1

A simple and symmetric firm resource
allocation model
Fundamental model form

The conceptual model (1) should be further specified
for the purposes of application. In this paper, a model
characterized as a simple and symmetric firm resource
allocation model is proposed and expressed as Formula
(2).
n
P
Max
si  price.pi /
s.t.

i D1
n
P

li D 1; i D 1; 2; :::; nI

iD1

pi D lib ; i D 1; 2; :::; n; b > 1I
si 6 ppi0i ; i D 1; 2; :::; nI
si 6 N; i D 1; 2; :::; nI
si 2 NC

(2)

“Simple” here means that in this model we do not
consider other organizational behaviors of firms, only
their resource allocation schemes. A more concrete
n
P
resource constraint function
li D 1 indicates the
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types of service are actually identical in our model. That
is to say, we do not differentiate services according to
their features but use an identical production function
pi D lib to characterize their input-output relationships.
Parameter b in the production function is set to be
greater than 1, thus there are increasing returns to
specialization. It implies the more resources a firm
puts into one service direction, the more output it can
gain per unit investment. This phenomenon is called
specialized-economy, it exists when the production
function is convex. Figure 1 demonstrates the shape of
the production function used in our model. As it shows,
both the first and second derivatives of this production
function are positive. In addition, for any x3 x2 D
x2 x1 , we have the inequality y3 y2 > y2 y1 .
Individual firms are rational and driven by a certain
target. In our model, the firm’s optimization objective
is to maximize profits. The profit function is defined
n
P
as
si price(pi /, where si represents the number
iD1

of consumers who have bought the i -th service
from this firm, and price(pi / represents the price of
the i -th service. Pricing strategy of service will be
discussed in detail later. Production capacity constraint
is characterized as si 6 pi =pi 0 , where pi 0 is the amount
of the i -th service that a consumer demands. This
production capacity constraint demonstrates a truism:
a firm cannot sell services in excess of output amount.
Market size constraint is characterized as si 6 N,
where N represents the number of consumers a firm
could access. This capacity constraint illustrates another
obvious point of logic: The number of consumers
who have bought services from a firm cannot exceed
its market size, under the assumption that both firms
y

1

y=x b, b>1

y3

i D1

total resources a firm could control is limited by 1,
which means a firm cannot expand its production
scale by recruiting new workers, but can only adjust
resource allocation among different service directions.
Moreover, we focus our attention on services rather than
physical commodities, thus the inventory problem is not
included in our model. Symmetric here means different

y2
y1
0

x1

x2

x3

1

x

Fig. 1 Shape of production function with specializedeconomy.
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and consumers are geographically fixed. An intuitive
demonstration of the market size constraint is shown
in Fig. 2, where the upper layer represents firms, and
the lower layer represents consumers. Both firms and
consumers are distributed randomly with one-to-one
correspondence and tied to the initial location. Any
given firm can only sell services to consumers within
the circumference of the circle, which is centered by
that firm, with a radius equal to s. Specifically, this
parameter, s; is named the reachable transaction scope
in this paper.
We also assume that consumers demand all n types of
service and transactions can be fulfilled only when all of
a consumer’s demands could be met. This assumption
has certain practical background in empirical data.
Take e-commerce transactions as an example. When
shopping online, consumers generally go through three
periods, they are browsing an e-commerce website,
paying through an electronic payment system and then
receiving the commodity from the logistics service
provider. Through the whole e-commerce transaction
process, the e-commerce firm’s role is to offer the
service of information flow, then the service of cash
flow, and finally deferring to logistics firms whose role
it is to offer the service of physical distribution. The
absence of any one of these three services will lead to
the failure of online shopping. We cannot imagine a
consumer would pay for a product which could not be
delivered to him, or a seller would send a product to a
person who will not pay for it.
3.2.2

Pricing strategy

Under the above assumptions and settings, the firm’s
service pricing strategy will be discussed in detail.
At the beginning, when reachable transaction scope is
0, each firm can only offer services to the corresponding
one consumer in their locality. At this time, for a
consumer-firm pair, the amount of service supplied is

One ﬁrm
One consumer

s

Fig. 2

Two-layer structure of firms and consumers.

just equal to the amount of service demanded. As
mentioned above in Section 3.2.1, different services
are seen as identical in our model, so at initialization,
for any type of n services, a consumer’s demand is
n b and a firm’s optimal resource allocation scheme is
l1 D l2 D    D ln D 1=n.
To be sustained, firms need to earn money. If,
initially, the money that a firm charges for one unit
service is set as parameter c, then every firm earns a
profit of nc and every consumer pays a cost of nc to
avail of all n types of service. Specifically, the amount
of nc is set to be the minimum profitability that a firm
must obtain in order to maintain operations. With the
expansion of reachable transaction scope, the number
of consumers that a firm could access increases. Due to
the effect of specialized-economy demonstrated in Fig.
1, the firm could adjust its resource allocation scheme to
be more focused, thus serving more people to enhance
its profitability. If the firm has no ambition to earn more
money but just wants to maintain the least necessary
profitability, we would invoke a temporary assumption
such that for every type of service offered by this firm,
its price will be set as follows.
nc
n1 b c
price.pi / D Pn
(3)
pi D Pn
b
i D1 n b
i D1 li
Because of the symmetric property of our model, if
reachable transaction scope is large enough, then there
always exists a division network in which people can
get all n types of service from firms with symmetric
resource allocation. Take n=3 as an example, if the
business model, l1 D a; l2 D b; l3 D c, is competitive,
then l1 D a; l2 D c; l3 D b; l1 D b; l2 D c; l3 D a;
l1 D b; l2 D a; l3 D c; l1 D c; l2 D b; l3 D a; and
l1 D c; l2 D a; l3 D b, are the other five competitive
business models. Therefore, consumers can get all n
types of service at the same cost. More generally, the
cost to acquire all services is expressed as Formula (4).
n2 b c
(4)
Cost.p1 ; p2 ; : : : ; pn/ D nprice.pi / D Pn
b
i D1 li
Compare the initial cost nc with Cost(p1 ; p2 ; : : : ; pn /,
the following relationship can be derived.
initialCost Cost.p1 ; p2 ; :::; pn / D
n2 b c
nc Pn
D
b
i D1 li

P
n2 b c nb 1 niD1 lib 1
>
Pn
b
i D1 li
n2 b c.nb 1 n1 b 1/
D0
(5)
Pn
b
i D1 li
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That is to say, due to the effect of specializedeconomy, although the firm’s minimum necessary
profitability level is unchanged, the consumer could
buy the same amount of service with less money. It is
surely unfair that all the benefits generated from the
firm specialization are captured by consumers. Actually,
the firm has an incentive for acquiring money in order
to improve their survival status. However, because of
the pressure from rivals, the firm cannot capture those
benefits unilaterally. Here we define a parameter  to
represent the proportion of the benefit captured by the
firm,  belongs to the open interval of 0 and 1. Now the
pricing strategy price(pi / is updated as Formula (6).
price.p i / D

Pn
n1 b c
1 n2 b c nb 1 i D1 lib 1
C 
D
Pn
Pn
b
b
n
i D1 li
i D1 li

P
n1 b c 1  C nb 1 niD1 lib
(6)
Pn
b
iD1 li
Finally, our proposed simple and symmetric firm
resource allocation model could be transformed into a
more specific form as follows.


Pn
b
1 b
b 1
n
c
1

C
n
l
Xn
j D1 j
Max
si 
Pn
b
i D1
j D1 lj
Pn
s.t.
i D1 li D 1; i D 1; 2; :::; nI
pi D lib ; i D 1; 2; :::; n; b > 1I
pi
si 6
; i D 1; 2; :::; nI
(7)
pi 0
b
pi0 D n ; i D 1; 2; :::; nI
si 6 N; i D 1; 2; :::; nI
si 2 NC I
 2 .0; 1/
3.2.3

Model solution

Problem (7) is a discrete and non-convex optimization
problem, which resists being solved analytically. Some
further transformation and simplification is necessary to
find the optimal solution. Considering price(pi / and si
are two non-negative values, si should be maximized in
its feasible region if we want to maximize the objective
function. After removing the negative integer constraint
to si , a brief form of the original optimization problem
is obtained as Formula (8).
!
1 
b 1
1 b
Max n c  Pn
C n

b
i D1 li
Pn
b b
i D1 min.n li ; N /
Pn
(8)
s.t.
i D1 li D 1I
b > 1I
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 2 .0; 1/
The optimal solution of problem (8) is subject to
parameter N , which is the number of consumers that
a firm could access for purposes of service provision. It
is important to observe a certain fact to solve problem
(8). As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, the smallest amount
of services that a consumer needs in our model is n b ,
so for any resource allocation scheme, if there exists
li 2 .0; 1=n/, then it will not be optimal. Because the
investment of li is insufficient to serve even one person,
li is wasted. Based on this recognition, we can analyze
this optimization problem from three perspectives.
First, let us consider an extreme case. If N is always
P
b
bigger than nb , namely when
i min.nb li ; N / D
b
nb li , the optimization problem could be simplified into
Formula (9). Considering nb c is a positive constant
and the constraint b > 1, the maximum value of the
objective function could be achieved when there is a
li D 1 and for any j ¤ i , lj D 0. That is to say, if the
market size that a firm could access has exceeded a
certain threshold, then the optimal business model is to
focus on one service direction and direct all resource
into it. This business model is named the completely
specialized model, because accordant firms offer only
one type of service.
Xn
Max nc  .1 / C nb c 
lb
i D1 i
Pn
s.t.
i D1 li D 1
(9)
b > 1I
 2 .0; 1/
Further, there is another extreme case at the other
side of this story. When parameter N equals 1, which
means the individual firm can only access one consumer
in its locality, the optimization problem could be
simplified into Formula (2). Considering n1 b c.1 )
is a positive value, the maximum value of the objective
function could be achieved when li =1/n. It means, if
the market size is so small that a firm can only serve
one local consumer, then the optimal business model
is to allocate resources across all service directions
equally. This business model is named the self-sufficient
model herein, for a firm in this state offers all types of
service by itself.
n1 b c.1 /
Max
Pn
b
i D1 li
Pn
(10)
s.t.
i D1 li D 1I
b > 1I
 2 .0; 1/
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jdjdj
Now, the cases between the two forgoing extreme
situations are investigated. With increasing N , the
firm has more and more space to adjust its resource
allocation scheme to earn more money. As analyzed
in the previous paragraph, li is either zero or not less
than 1/n, thus starting from the initial self-sufficient
state, firm’s resource allocation adjustment will not be
continuous, but discretely reducing 1/n amount input
from one service direction and reallocating it among
others. The question how to allocate this 1/n amount
of resource is related with the form of the production
function. In our model, the production function pi D
lib is convex, an easy proof would show that more
output could be gained if this 1/n amount of resource
is wholly added to one chosen direction, which is
named the specialized direction in this paper, rather than
distributed more widely. Similarly, if the market size
is expanded further and N is large enough to permit
more adjustment, a 1/n amount of resource will be taken
back from a low-investment direction and channeled
into a specialized direction, which is chosen in the first
reallocation step. By this logic, with the expansion of
reachable transaction scope from completely localized
to full coverage, the firm’s optimal resource allocation
scheme switches from an equal allocation to a wholly
specialized allocation, gradually and systematically.
3.2.4

Background story

The evolution of China’s commercial society from a
traditional offline market to an e-commerce market
is a practical demonstration of the analytical results
of our proposed model. Different from developed
countries such as America, China did not experience
a steady and sufficient self-development process, but
went through a pronounced and dramatic evolution
from a traditional agricultural society to an industry
dominated society in about 30 years, and now it’s
on the way to becoming a society characterized by
modernization. Therefore, China offers us a good case
study to take a look at the evolution of economic
society via technology development. Basically, retail
commerce consists of three service elements, they
are information flow service, cash flow service, and
logistics service. We are going to see how these three
service elements combine and separate during China’s
commercial evolution process.
Now, returning to the early stage of reform and
opening-up of China, when the country’s commercial
facilities were extremely inadequate and the impact of
merchants and products was restricted to their local

areas. At that time, the first Chinese merchants typically
employed a primitive business model. They utilized
their own housing to create storefronts, purchased
selected commodities or even produced commodities
themselves, and sold them to people via face-to-face
transactions. Another interesting example which is
characteristic of the Chinese context is the traveling
salesman, who carries around certain portable goods
and sells them by walking around the streets. This was
an era when the three basic service elements are selfsufficient by virtue of being supplied by merchants
themselves.
While as the economy developed and facilities were
improved, Chinese merchants were able to access
more consumers, and new business formats, such as
the marketplace and emporium, started to emerge.
In a marketplace or emporium, instead of owning
shops themselves, sellers rent space to do business. In
some emporiums, orders and cash are settled together
centrally. So, as we can see, the service elements are
initially apart.
Then at last, when it comes to the era of e-commerce
in the 21st century, commercial affairs have changed
fundamentally. Due to internet technology, physical
restrictions on merchants have dissipated. On one
hand, internet and information technology empowers
individuals to make contact with others from any corner
of the world. All supply and demand information can
be gathered and displayed on a website. Merchants and
consumers do not have to be in close proximity to match
with each other. Further, merchants are relieved of
requiring shelves and shops; with the help of online
shops, there is no need to own or rent a shopfront to run
a business. An extreme example is a digital commodity,
which does not require any physical storage. In the
market for online digital commodities, the phenomenon
of long-tail economy resonates incisively and vividly.
In the e-commerce environment, a new but obvious
change could be observed that the three service
elements separate further, or even completely. What
will happen if a consumer wants to buy something
now? First, he will search for it on an e-commerce
website, look through its description, and communicate
with the seller if necessary. Then if satisfied with
the product and price, the consumer will pay for it
through online banking or third party payment tools.
After payment, the product will be delivered to him
by third party logistics firms. Considering the whole
consuming process, product information is passed on
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by e-commerce websites, the payment is accomplished
with the help of online payment tools, the product is
sent to the buyer by logistics firms. All three basic
service elements are provided by independent and
highly specialized firms. Technological advances are
thought to play an important role in these changes, but
what are the underlying evolutionary mechanisms and
dynamics? We will explain this with the help of our
proposed simple and symmetric firm resource allocation
model.
3.2.5

A specific example

After setting the number of services n to be 3,
specialized-economy degree parameter b to be 2, and
surplus proportion parameter  to be 0.5, our model is
embodied as the following form.
!
X3
c
1
Max
C3 
 P3
min.6li2 ; N /
b
i D1
6
l
i D1 i
X3
s.t.
li D 1
(11)
i D1

As we analyzed in Section 3.2.3, the optimal
solution to problem (11) jumps between several discrete
points based on the value of parameter N . Figure 3
demonstrates the transformation process of the optimal
business model. The equilateral triangle in Fig. 3
represents the plane of l1 C l2 C l3 D 1; l1 > 0; l2 >
0; l3 > 0; and the three-dimensional location vector
of every point represents the resource allocation
scheme. At the beginning, when the reachable
transaction scope is limited to localities, the optimal
solution is the red center-point of the equilateral
triangle, which represents the self-sufficient business
model. Next, when the reachable transaction scope is
expanded to exceed the first threshold, optimal resource
allocation changes towards a more specialized scheme,
(0,0,1)

(1/3,0,2/3)

(0,1/3,2/3)

(2/3,0,1/3)

(0,2/3,1/3)
(1/3,1/3,1/3)

(0,1,0)

(1,0,0)
(2/3,1/3,0) (1/3,2/3,0)

Fig. 3

Optimal business model evolution.
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1/3 amount of resource is taken back from a randomly
chosen service direction and channeled to one of the
other directions. In this stage, there are six optimal
business models, which lie on the three edges of
the equilateral triangle. At last, when the reachable
transaction scope is continually expanded until larger
than the second threshold, the optimal business model
changes to be completely specialized. The firm takes
1/3 amount of resource back from the direction with less
investment and puts it into the specialized direction. In
this stage, only three completely specialized business
models are competitive in the market, which lie on the
three vertexes of the equilateral triangle.
3.3

Characteristics of division network evolution

Besides the evolutionary behavior of individual firms,
there is another type of evolution at the macro level,
that is the evolution of the division network. Different
from the situation in the manufacturing field, where
real and large-volume transactions are taking place
every day among different companies, firms in the
retail market typically confront end-users directly. In
the retail field, the buyer-seller relationship between
two firms may not really exist, rather it is an implicit
linkage. For example, in order to buy a product, a
consumer may get information service from company
A, payment service from company B, and logistic
service from company C. So there are implicit linkages
among companies A, B, and C. We could say company
A buys payment and logistics services from companies
B and C, or company B buys information and logistics
services from companies A and C, or company C buys
information and payment services from companies A
and B. These three expressions tell us the same thing.
On this basis, the evolution of a division network in
the retail market can be demonstrated. Let a red square
denote one unit of information service input, a yellow
square denote one unit of payment service input, and
a blue square denote one unit of logistic service input,
then the evolution of the retail market division network
could be demonstrated as Fig. 4. Figure 4a presents a
self-sufficient stage, when individual firm unilaterally
offers three basic services to consumers. Figure 4b
illustrates the structure of a semi-specialized division
network, when individual firms randomly abandon one
service direction to become more focused. In this
stage, firms with different resource allocation schemes
generally have implicit linkages with each other. At last,
when the reachable transaction scope has exceeded the
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One unit of information
service input
One unit of logistic
service input
One unit of payment
service input

(a)
Fig. 4
stage.

(b)

(c)

Optimal division network evolution: (a) self-sufficient stage, (b) semi-specialized stage, and (c) completely specialized

second threshold, the competitive business model turns
out to be completely specialized, as Fig. 4c shows.
Although Fig. 4 reveals the evolutionary process of
a relatively simple market, some interesting rules can
be delineated from it, which may have more general
significance beyond this application. First, as we see,
there are three optimal division networks during the
whole evolutionary process, which exactly equals the
number of required service elements. Second, if we
conceived the division network as a graph, it could be
found that the number of vertexes changes from low to
high, then back to low again. Third, as for the edges
of the division graph, they are different in terms of the
content flowing in them. For example, for a firm with a
certain business model, it may get more than one type
of service through a single edge, or it may get the same
type of service through more than one edge. Also, with
the evolution of the division network, a firm needs more
and more services offered by other firms with different
business models.
Some investigation is required to further understand
division network characteristics. Our attention is
focused on three features mentioned in the last
paragraph: the number of evolutionary stages, the
number of competitive business models and linkages
among them, and the edge-properties in every division
graph.
Next, in what follows, some propositions and
definitions, with necessary proofs, are posited.
Proposition 1. In a market consisting of n types of
service, there are n optimal division networks in the
whole evolutionary process.
As we have analyzed in Section 3.2.4, the firm
evolves from its current business model to the next

competitive business model by taking 1/n amount of
resource back from a low-investment direction and
channeling it to a specialized direction. Once a firm
selected a specialized service direction, it would be
unjustifiably costly for this firm to switch to another
specialized service direction, for resource depletion is
unavoidable in the transition process. Therefore, the
investment in the specialized service direction increases
from 1/n to 1 during the whole evolutionary process,
and in every step 1/n amount of investment is added.
Clearly, such a process takes n steps and there are n
optimal division networks in total.
Proposition 2. In the i -th (16 i 6 n/ evolutionary
stage, there are C1n Cnn i1 competitive business models in
the current optimal division network.
In the i -th evolutionary stage, any competitive
business model contains a specialized direction with
i /n amount of resource investment and the other (n
i / nonzero service directions obtain 1/n amount of
resource investment. So to count all the possibilities,
we first choose one specialized direction from n types
of service, containing C1n possible choices, then we
choose n i nonzero alternative service directions
from the remaining n 1 services, which represents
Cnn i1 possible choices. Combing these two types
of choices together, there are C1n Cnn 11 competitive
business models in the i -th optimal division network.
Definition 1. The set of services that flow in one edge
is defined as this edge’s elements set, and the size of one
edge’s elements set is defined as this edge’s diversity.
Definition 2. For a certain division graph, the purity
P Dn
P
of this graph is defined as ( ii D1
xi = i /= ii Dn
D1 xi ,
where xi is the number of edges connecting to the
same business model and with a diversity of j , n is the
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maximum edge diversity in the current division graph.
The purity degree of a division graph is a number
between 0 and 1. The closer a division graph’s purity
degree is to 1, the less types of service an edge contains.
Figure 5a shows purity degree trends from the second
evolutionary stage when the number of required service
types equals 6, 10, and 15, respectively. It is shown that
the purity degree of the optimal division network first
decreases below 1 and then increases back to 1 again in
the last evolutionary stage.
Proposition 3. For the i-th optimal division graph in
the evolutionary process, if n is the maximum diversity
that an edge could have in the current division graph,
then for any i < n, we have the following formula,
where xj is the number of edges connecting to the same
business model and with a diversity of j .
xj D Cjn i Cji

1 n i C1 j
C
2 Cn i C1
C1n i Cji 1 Cnn ii C1j
1

C C1i 1 Cij

(12)

First, one point needs to be emphasized, that in
the i -th evolutionary stage of a market with n types
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of service, every business model contains n i C 1
services, and needs to get the remaining n i services
from other business models.
The three components of Formula (12) are considered
in three concrete cases.
The first case is two business models have the same
specialized direction. In this case, if one business
model is kept fixed, in order to obtain an edge with a
diversity of j , the other business model needs to choose
j services from all n i services contained by the
fixed business model and replace them with j services
selected from i 1 services needed by the fixed business
model. So in this case, there are Cjn i Cji 1 possible
combinations in all.
The second case is two business models have
different specialized directions, and each business
model does not contain the other one’s specialized
service. In other words, these two business models’
specialized services are complementary. In this case
if one business model is kept fixed, in order to obtain
an edge with a diversity of j , the other business model

Fig. 5 Evolution of division network edges: (a) evolution of purity degree, (b) evolution of concentration degree, (c) evolution
of dependence degree, and (d) evolution of compactness degree.
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needs to first pick one service as specialized direction
from i 1 services contained by the fixed business
model, and then pick j 1 services as complementary
directions from i 2 services needed by the fixed
business model, and finally pick n i 1 j services
as mutual directions from n i 1 services. Therefore,
C1 j
in this case, there are C1i 1 Cij 21 Cnn ii C1
possible
combinations in all.
The third case is when two business models have
different specialized directions, and two specialized
directions are their mutual services. In this case if one
business model is kept fixed, in order to obtain an edge
with a diversity of j , the other business model needs
to pick one service as specialized direction from n i
services contained by the fixed business model first, and
then pick j services as complementary directions from
i 1 services needed by the fixed business model, and
at last pick n i j services as mutual directions from
n i C 1 services. Therefore, in this case, there are
C1n i Cji 1 Cnn ii C1j possible combinations in all.
The number of edges connecting to the same business
model and with a diversity of j in the i-th evolution
stage is the sum of the results in the above three cases.
Definition 3. For a certain division graph, its
dispersibility is defined as the number of edges
connecting to the same business model and contain the
same type of service.
Proposition 4. For the optimal division network
in the i -th evolution stage, its dispersibility could
be calculated through Formula (13), where xj is the
number of edges connecting to the same business model
and with a diversity of j , n is the maximum diversity an
edge could have in the current division graph.
Xn
xj
Dispersibility(Gi / D
(13)
j D1 Cj
i 1
Based on the definition, we could find xj is a multiple
of all combinations of j services selected from i 1
services set. If we assume the multiple as m, then
in all the edges with a diversity of j , for a certain
type of service, it could be found m times. Therefore,
the dispersibility of a division graph is the sum of all
multiples.
Definition 4. The reciprocal of a division graph’s
dispersibility is defined as its concentration degree.
The concentration degree of a division graph is a
number between 0 and 1. The closer a division graph’s
concentration degree is to 1, for a certain type of
service needed by a business model, the less providers
it has. Figure 5b shows the concentration degree trend
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from the second evolutionary stage when the number of
required service types is 6, 10, and 15, respectively. It
is shown that the concentration degree of the optimal
division network first decreases from a nonzero value
before increasing to 1 in the last evolution stage.
Definition 5. In the current division graph, the
proportion of services that a business model needs
to get from others is defined as this division graph’s
dependence degree.
The dependence degree of a division graph is a
number between 0 and 1. Dependence degree 1 denotes
that in the current division graph all business models
are completely specialized, while dependence degree 0
denotes that the current competitive business model is
self-sufficient. Figure 5c shows the dependence degree
trend from the second evolutionary stage when the
number of required service types equals 6, 10, and 15,
respectively. It is shown that the dependence degree of
the optimal division network monotonically increases
from a nonzero value to 1.
Definition 6.
The result which is obtained
by multiplying a division graph’s purity degree,
concentration degree, and dependence degree together
is defined as this division graph’s compactness degree.
The compactness degree of a division graph is a
number between 0 and 1. It is an indicator of the degree
of integration of the current economic system. If a
division graph has a compactness degree of 1, then
conclusions could be drawn from three perspectives.
First, in such a division network, each firm offers only
one type of service and gets the other necessary services
from outside partners. Second, each firm gets every
needed service from only one firm. Third, no firm gets
services from firms which operate according to multiple
business models.
Figure 5d shows the compactness degree trend from
the second evolutionary stage when the number of
required service types equals 6, 10, and 15, respectively.
It is shown that the compactness degree of the optimal
division network first decreases from a nonzero value
and then increases to 1 in the last evolutionary stage.

4

Simulation Experiment

In order to validate our simple and symmetric
firm resource allocation model, a CAS simulation
framework is constructed and simulation experiments
are carried out. A complex adaptive system perspective
is well suited for modeling the dynamic evolution
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process of the e-commerce market and firm resource
allocation behaviors therein. For just as CAS theory
argues, there are numerous autonomous and intelligent
individuals in the Chinese e-commerce market,
various macroeconomic phenomena emerge from these
individuals’ interaction and adaption behaviors.
4.1

Simulation framework

From top to bottom, three kinds of agents are delineated
and defined in our simulation experiment. They are
environment agents, firm agents, and consumer agents.
Table 1
Agent class

Rule
Rule E1: Size of world and
number of entities

Rule E2: Entity evolution process
Environment
Rule E3: Type of needed services
Rule E4: Reachable transaction
scope
Rule E5: Specialized-economy
degree

Consumers

The agents and action rules are listed and described in
detail in Table 1.
Environment agent represents the external
conditions which individual firms operate within
and are constrained by. It functions under two cases,
before the simulation starts and at the end of every
simulation cycle. Before the simulation starts, the
environment agent first generates the macroscopic
market in which firms and consumers undertake
various interactive activities. Specifically, a twodimensional world will be generated with a specified

Description of agents and rules.
Rule description
This rule defines the size of the world which is a two-dimensional plane for
entities (firms and consumers) to exist in, and generates a certain amount of
entities which are distributed geographically at random.
This rule specifies the processes of elimination, mutation, and learning in
intergenerational cycles. That is, at the end of every cycle, a certain proportion
of firms which exhibit the lowest fitness values will be eliminated, and some
mutation firms will be born and introduced into the market whenever unmet
demand exceeds a threshold, and the other firms will learn and adjust their
business models according to the performance of their nearby neighbors.
This rule sets the number and type of services needed by consumers.
This rule sets the maximum distance that one firm has access to for the purposes
of service provision.
This rule governs the degree of specialized-economy, that is, the productivity a
firm can gain from specialization.

This rule governs the firm’s resource allocation adjustment process among all
service directions. One firm can choose to increase or reduce the resource it
puts into one direction according to prevailing business conditions.
This rule defines how much service a firm can provide based on its business
Rule F2: Production
model and specialization degree among all directions.
Rule F3: Pricing strategy
This rule sets up the price of every service provided by a firm.
This rule defines the updating process of a firm’s fitness value. The fitness value
of a firm depends on the number of consumers who bought its services and the
Rule F4: Fitness updating
price per unit service.
This rule defines the learning process of firm. A firm will learn from the firm
with the highest fitness value in its reachable transaction scope. Specifically,
Rule F5: Learning
it will copy the business model and resource allocation scheme of the targeted
firm.
This rule defines firm mutation process. After the elimination of firms at the
end of every cycle, if unmet demand exceeds a certain threshold, then new firms
Rule F6: Mutation
will be introduced as mutations, which means these firms will choose business
models and generate resource allocation schemes randomly.
This rule describes the process by which consumers choose service providers.
A consumer will search their horizon and choose the firm which obtained the
Rule C1: Service provider selection
highest fitness value in the last simulation cycle and at least has one unit of
required service.
This rule defines how a consumer consumes a service. A consumer will
consume one unit service from every selected service provider if all their
Rule C2: Consuming
demand could be met by the current market.
Rule F1: Resource
allocation adjustment

Firms
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size, and equivalent firms and consumers will be
randomly and geographically distributed. It should be
noted that firms and consumers in our model exhibit
stationary one-to-one locational correspondence. One
consumer should not be understood in terms of their
existing only one person in every location, but should
be regarded as a collection of all demands. Basic
market and product attributes will also be set in this
step, including the number of required services, the
form and parameters of the production function, and
the length of reachable transaction scope. Finally, at
the end of every simulation cycle, the environment
agent will eliminate the firms with the lowest fitness
values and introduce some mutation firms if necessary,
imitating the process of natural selection.
Firm agent represents the decision making body in
our proposed model. It has the autonomous right to
change its business model and allocate its resource.
In our CAS-based simulation, the global resource
allocation is made by numerous dissipated individual
firms instead of via central planning. Based on its
business model, resource allocation and production
function, each firm produces a certain amount of
services at the beginning of every simulation cycle,
priced reasonably based on pricing strategy, which was
discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2. Then for every
type of service, consumers will search the firms in
their horizon and choose the lowest price option and
obtaining at least one unit amount of services. The
horizon of a consumer is equal to current reachable
transaction scope. If all demand could be met, a
consumer would purchase one unit service amount
from selected service providers respectively. After all
consumers have attempted to locate service providers
and purchase services, whether successfully or not, each
firm would calculate its profits gained in this simulation
cycle in terms of fitness value. The firms whose average
fitness value in the last three cycles rank below a
specified threshold calculated based on the fitness of
all extant firms, would be eliminated and announced as
terminated. Whenever the number of consumers whose
demand has not been satisfied exceeds a threshold, the
environment agent will invoke some mutation firms
and distribute them randomly across the locations of
the previously terminated firms. A mutation firm is
a newborn firm which randomly chooses a business
model and randomly allocates its resources to service
directions. After the elimination and mutation

Tsinghua Science and Technology, February 2017, 22(1): 10–28

procedure, extant firms learn from others one by one.
Each extant firm will search all the other extant firms
in current reachable transaction scope, compare their
fitness values, and copy the most competitive firm’s
business model and resource allocation scheme. In
order to avoid the formation of a herd[25] , which would
cause excess volatility, each firm can only be learned
from once.
On the whole, the simulation process can be
summarized by five steps. They are market generation,
service production, service consumption, firm
elimination and mutation, and learning procedure.
In the market generation step, a market with a
specified size is created and a series of environmental
variables are determined. Then firms produce services
based on their resource allocation, and consumers
purchase services one by one. After completion of the
consumption step, based on its profitability, a firm will
be either eliminated or survive to the next cycle. At last,
after each extant firm conducts learning procedures,
this simulation cycle ends. By this way, the simulation
experiment is carried on interactively and the market
division network keeps evolving until reaching an
equilibrium state.
There are two more details which should be
emphasized in our simulation framework. In order to
provide evolution an initial impetus, some firms are
born as mutations before the simulation starts. Whether
the genes of mutation firms will be passed on or
culling occurs, is decided by simulation mechanism.
Specifically, the elimination procedure will retain
the competitive entities across all mutations, and
the learning procedure will spread these competitive
business models around the market. Also, in order to
accelerate the process to reach equilibrium and balance
firms’ herd behaviors, some smart firms are generated.
Different from the action rules of simple firms listed
in Table 1, smart firms do not adjust their business
models according to neighbors’ fitness, but according
to market shortage. At the end of every cycle, a smart
firm investigates the firms and consumers in current
reachable transaction scope, compares every service’s
supply and demand amount, and allocates his resource
based on market shortage. That is, if the supply of some
type of service could not meet all consumers’ demands
within current reachable transaction scope, then the
smart firm will put more resources in that direction,
aiming to balance supply and demand.
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4.2

Experimental design

While this simulation experiment is primarily designed
to validate our simple and symmetric firm resource
allocation model in Section 3, we also try to gain
more knowledge on the dynamic characteristics of the
e-commerce market evolution process. The following
three aspects attract our attention in particular. The first
two correspond to the validation of our proposed model,
and the third concerns e-commerce market dynamic
evolutionary characteristics in terms of firm number,
profitability, and cost related affairs.
(1) Evolution of the division network
In Section 3.2.6, we draw a conclusion that with the
expansion of reachable transaction scope, firms will be
increasingly specialized and several optimal division
networks will emerge. Do experimental simulation
results confirm this conclusion? Additionally, the
analytical solution is focused on the final-state situation.
However, there does not exist any visible or appreciable
power above to satisfice this. So can the analytical
equilibrium be reached in reality? If yes, what dynamic
and discrete transition processes are associated with it?
Such questions need to be answered through simulation
experiments.
(2) Edges linking different business models
In Section 3.2.6, we defined the purity degree,
concentration degree, dependence degree, and
compactness degree of a division network to
characterize the edges linking different business
models. As Fig. 5 delineates, with the evolution of the
division network, the purity of the optimal division
graph first decreases from one to a nonzero value and
then rises towards 1 again; the concentration follows
a similar rule, while the dependence of the optimal
division graph increases monotonically from 0 to 1.
As a result, the compactness degree of the optimal
division network rises from 0 to 1. These propositional
characteristics need to be validated by simulation
experiments.
(3) Number and profitability of firms
In the current e-commerce market, we can observe
two obvious phenomena. On one hand, offline stores
feel more and more pressure from the online market
and some types of offline stores, such as electronics
hypermarkets and bookstores, have to reduce in
size or even cease operations. On the other hand,
online business participants are involved in fierce
competition, price wars and advertising wars emerge

23

one after another. Most e-commerce firms maintain low
profitability or even lose money. So the question is, at
the micro level, how does the number of firms change
with the expansion of reachable transaction scope?
How does individual firm’s profitability evolve? What
will consumers and society gain from these changes?
Before the simulation experiment, some necessary
variables and parameters should be initially assigned.
Values of all parameters in the simulation are listed
in Table 2. Specifically, in our simulation experiment,
environment agent will generate a two-dimensional
square world with a 55 area. Then 400 firms and 400
consumers are distributed randomly in the world, with
one-to-one correspondence. Three types of services are
needed in the market, each of which has a production
function of pi D li2 , where li 2 Œ0; 1. The mutation
rate is set to be 5%, whenever unmet demand exceeds
5% of total demand, mutation firms will be invoked.
Also, in the first simulation cycle, 10% mutation firms
will be born to provide an initial evolutionary impetus,
and 20% smart firms will be born to balance strength
to avoid the herd phenomenon. Through the whole
simulation experiment, reachable transaction scope
increases from 0 to 1, with a step of 0.01. For a certain
value of reachable transaction scope, the simulation will
run for 500 iterations, and the average results of the last
10 iterations will be recorded as final results. To avoid
possible deviations in a single experiment, the whole
simulation experiment will be repeated 10 times, so
there are 10010 simulations in all, and each simulation
contains 500 iterations.
4.3
4.3.1

Results and discussions
Division network evolution: Specialization
degree and competitive business model

As seen in Fig. 6a, with the expansion of reachable
transaction scope from 0 to 1, the number of consumers
Table 2

Values of parameters in simulation experiments.

Parameter
World size
Firm number
Consumer number
Needed service types
Specialized-economy degree
Mutation rate
Mutation introducing threshold
First mutation rate
Smart firms rate
Reachable transaction scope

Value
55
400
400
3
2
5%
5%
10%
20%
[0, 1]
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Fig. 6

Simulated firm-level evolution: (a) individual firms market size, (b) business models, and (c) average specialized degree.

that a firm could access increases exponentially. When
the market size converges on the first threshold, in our
simulation experiment it is when reachable transaction
scope increases to circa 0.15 and the average market
size reaches circa 2, self-sufficiency is no longer
the only active business model. Semi-specialized
and completely specialized business models begin
to appear and grow. During the process, reachable
transaction scope increases from 0.15 to 0.37 and the
number of self-sufficient firms continues to decrease
towards a minimum, while semi-specialized firms and
completely specialized firms keep growing. It should
be noted that although the number of semi-specialized
firms is always bigger than the number of completely
specialized firms in this period, it starts to fall towards
the end of the period. When reachable transaction
scope exceeds the second threshold, which is circa 0.37
in Fig. 6b, the completely specialized business model
becomes the most competitive business model and
keeps on growing until it accounts for nearly 90% of
all firms. Meanwhile, the number of semi-specialized
firms decreases until it only accounts for about 10%,
and then remains stable. While self-sufficient firms
are cleared out of the market swiftly, the remaining
few self-sufficient firms can be explained as mutations
introduced in every simulation iteration. In sum, as
Fig. 6c demonstrates, with the expansion of reachable
transaction scope, the average specialized degree of
all extant firms rises from 0 to nearly 2, which means
the competitive business model changes from selfsufficient to semi-specialized and, finally, to completely
specialized. Simulation experiment results confirm the
analytical results associated with our proposed model
in Section 3.2.5.
4.3.2

Evolution of edges in division networks

Four defined indicators to characterize the evolution of

division network edges in Section 3.2.6 are calculated
and demonstrated in Fig. 7: purity degree, concentration
degree, dependence degree, and compactness degree.
Diverging somewhat from their base definitions and
derivations, in Fig. 7, the first three indicators are
calculated directly from simulation experiment data
whilst the compactness degree is a multiplicative
function of them. Overall, the trends contain substantial
realistic and dynamic information. When the reachable
transaction scope is below 0.15 and all firms are selfsufficient, we set the purity degree and concentration
degree to 1, and the dependence degree to 0.
As Fig. 7 demonstrates, the purity degree of the
division network edges first decreases below 1 before
rising to 1 again. Thus a number of firms used to offer
more than one service to the same single firm. Because
only three types of service exist in our simulation
experiments, this downtrend in purity degree is short
lived. Meanwhile, the concentration degree experiences
a steep decline before gradually rising back towards
1. This sheds light on how the evolutionary process is
manifested by quite a lot of business models existing
in the market, and for a certain service type one
firm has linkages with a range of other firms. It is a
period when different types of firms are loosely joined
together. As for the dependence degree, it is another
expression of the specialized degree. So as we can see,
with the expansion of reachable transaction scope, the
dependence degree increases monotonically from 0 to
1. Finally the compactness degree is calculated and
shown as Fig. 7d. It should be noted that the process
of increasing compactness degree actually includes two
stages, corresponding to the two evolutionary stages
of the division network in Fig. 6b. When reachable
transaction scope is expanded from 0.2 to 0.4, the
compactness degree of the division network goes
through its first increasing stage, rising from almost 0
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Fig. 7 Simulated division network evolution: (a) purity degree, (b) concentration degree, (c) dependence degree, and (d)
compactness degree.

to about 0.2. After hovering around 0.4 for a while, it
then monotonically increases to 1. This is the second
evolutionary stage, in which the economic system
achieves the greatest degree of integration degree and
different types of firm are tightly coupled.
4.3.3 Firm evolution
At the micro level, Fig. 8 discloses the evolution of
firms from two perspectives: number of extant firms
and average profitability. Also, it illustrates what this
firm-level evolution will bring to consumers and wider
society.
First, with the expansion of reachable transaction
scope, the number of firms increases marginally n the
beginning before dropping sharply from nearly 400
all the way down to 130. Second, the profitability
of individual firms decreases from 1.1 to below 0.7
in the first stage and then increases to above 1.2.
The initial increase in firm numbers can be explained
by the introduction of mutations. When reachable
transaction scope is below the first threshold 0.2, selfsufficiency is the only competitive business model and
any attempt to invoke new business models will lead
to termination. So at that time, markets are stable and
silent, no mutation firm can survive. When reachable
transaction scope is 0.2, the market size has enlarged

enough for firms to try new business models. So
mutation firms with competitive business models can
survive and spread their genes, and the number of total
firms increases slightly due to this. When reachable
transaction scope is expanded further, more and more
firms employ specialized business models. If total
demand remains unchanged, and a more specialized
business model can raise individual firm’s output, the
number of extant firms declines consistently. As for
profitability, the decrease in the number of firms does
not increase earnings of the remainder. This is because
the expansion of reachable transaction scope has broken
local exclusive markets and merges them gradually.
In the early stage, individual firm’s output exceeds
total consumers’ demand that it could access. In this
situation, the individual firm faces great competitive
pressures from others and could not sell all of its service
units, thus average profitability keeps decreasing in this
stage. When reachable transaction scope is expanded
to be so large that individual firm could not meet
total consumers’ demand with the current reachable
transaction scope, competitive pressures will ease
gradually. Firms start to sell more and more services,
and their average profitability rises. Finally, extant
firms can gain more profit than at any other time in
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Fig. 8 Simulated society-level evolution: (a) change in average firm number, (b) change in average profitability, (c) change in
cost per service unit, and (d) change in total social cost.

evolutionary history.
What changes will firm-level evolution bring to
ordinary consumers and society as a whole? Figures
8c and 8d posit an answer to this question from the
perspectives of average service cost and total social
cost. As Formula (5) expresses, the average price of
unit service decreases with the expansion of reachable
transaction scope. This is because specialized business
models enable individual firms to offer more service, so
they are willing to reduce price in order to sell more.
Figure 8c confirms this and Fig. 8d shows how total
social cost obeys the same rule.
Therefore in summary, if we see e-commerce as
a strength which has expanded reachable transaction
scope to a considerably large value, then we can
speculate that in a highly developed and fully evolved
e-commerce market, firm’s profitability and ordinary
consumer’s wealth level are both promoted. However,
on the way to achieving this, numerous firms need to
close down or change their business model.

5

Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper, we proposed a simple and symmetric
firm resource allocation model to investigate how firms
allocate resources among different directions based on

differences in reachable transaction scope, and how
division networks form, function, and evolve with
it. Specifically, we focus our attention on the evolution
of the e-commerce market, in which individual firm’s
reachable transaction scope has been greatly expanded
to cover the global market. Our interest is how this
fundamental change drives firm and market level
evolutionary behavior, and whether any observed
or deduced trends can characterize this evolutionary
process.
Through the analysis of our proposed model, two
principal conclusions are drawn. First, at the firm level,
with the expansion of reachable transaction scope,
the firm discretely takes back one unit of investment
from a low-investment direction and channels it into
the specialized direction. The firm-level evolutionary
path is characterized as a process in which firms
constantly abandon some type of service to focus
on an increasingly specialized direction, which is
chosen at the initialization step of evolution. Second,
at the market level, the optimal division network
transfers discretely among several graphs. A series of
definitions and propositions are given and proved to
represent market level evolution. Compactness degree
is a defined comprehensive indicator to characterize
relationships among firms. With the expansion of
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reachable transaction scope, the compactness degree
of the division network rises from 0 to 1. Thus in
a highly developed and fully evolved e-commerce
market, individual firms exhibit great dependence on
outside companies. Excepting the specialized direction
case, individual firms get every other service from
completely specialized firm which only offer one
service. We found that in a fully evolved e-commerce
market, firms are highly integrated and tightly coupled.
Furthermore, in order to validate our proposed
model and related analytical results, we build a
CAS-based simulation framework and carry out a
series of simulation experiments. Environment agent,
firm agent, and consumer agent, together with
their action rules, are constructed respectively. By
introducing the natural selection mechanisms of
mutation, elimination, and adaptation, we attempt to
determine how the macroeconomic system evolves with
numerous micro-level individuals. The results of these
simulation experiments accord with the propositions
and conclusions derived from our proposed model,
whilst offering substantial additional dynamic and
detailed information. Besides validation, with the
help of simulation experiments, we investigated how
the number of extant firms, average profitability of
individual firms, and cost per unit service change
during the evolutionary process. We found that in
a fully evolved e-commerce market, individual firms
can gain more money than at any prior time in
evolutionary history. Meanwhile, consumers can buy
the same amount of service with less money. From this
perspective, e-commerce is a win-win choice for both
firms and consumers. However, it should be noted
that some firms cannot adapt and survive the culling
procedures in this evolution.
There are numerous opportunities for future research
which could build on this study. First, our proposed
model does not consider business expansion or different
product/service features. Thus model development is
a possible direction for future research in order to
resonate better with actual empirical contexts. Second,
the pricing strategy in our model is a rough
and exogenous mechanism, but actual market price
is an endogenous variable. So individual firm’s
pricing strategy needs to be further investigated and
re-specified. Third, in our CAS-based simulation
framework, evolution is driven by individual’s mutation
and learning behavior. In real markets, besides
learning procedures, gaming behavior is increasingly
ubiquitous. So from a simulation perspective, micro-
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level individual interactions and gaming behaviors can
be further explored and developed to reflect intelligent
agent characteristics.
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